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Abstract 
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A growing literature in economics is devoted to the role of social comparisons in 
explaining various phenomena, including financial market behavior, criminal activity, and 
subjective well-being.  One part of this literature has focused on income comparisons and 
labor-market outcomes: quits are negatively correlated with a reference wage given by the 
average wage in the firm for similar workers; women’s labor force participation is 
influenced by income comparisons;  and rank in the local income distribution is a good 
predictor of migration.  These behaviors mostly concern job choice.  However, little is 
known about the impact of relative income on how hard employees actually work within 
the job, even though efficiency wage theories are built on the concept of income 
comparisons and relative concerns are appealed to as an  explanation of wage compression 
(Frank 1984).  
In this paper we try to fill this gap.  We analyze the influence of income comparisons 
on effort using both experimental and survey data.  We suggest that such income 
comparisons may explain why some of the empirical evidence on the wage-effort 
relationship is mixed: while it is commonplace to assume that wages have incentive 
effects, or that higher wages make up for higher effort in a compensating differential set-
up, higher wages are not always associated with greater effort in empirical work.  This has 
variously been explained by a crowding-out effect of monetary rewards on intrinsic 
motivation (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997), supra-optimal motivation generating choking 
under pressure (Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein and Mazar, 2005), or an earnings target 
which bounds effort at some threshold (Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein and Thaler 
1997).  Here we test an alternative hypothesis: that individual effort depends on both own 
income and the individual’s position in the relevant income distribution.  Due to social 
comparisons those who are paid relatively well work harder.  We test whether others’ 
income matters, and ask, given own income, which of relative income and income rank in 
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the reference group is most important in determining effort: are social comparisons 
cardinal or ordinal?  We further ask whether income comparisons are not only horizontal 
(i.e. to other individuals at the same point in time) but also intertemporal, so that the time 
profile of individual income or rank helps to explain current effort at work. 
Conclusive empirical proof of the existence of social comparisons is elusive, as it is 
difficult to know to whom individuals compare, and because individuals' behavior may be 
correlated within a group, not because they compare to each other, but because they are 
exposed to common unobserved environmental factors, or share similar characteristics. 
The experimental approach adopted here has the double advantage of defining a priori the 
reference group and limiting any contextual effects.  In addition, it relies on actual and 
costly decisions instead of subjective reported behavior.  Survey data, on the other hand, 
has the advantage of larger sample sizes, and avoids the criticism that laboratory 
experiments are to an extent unrealistic.  The combined use of both survey and 
experimental data is still very recent (Fehr, Fischbacher, von Rosenbladt, Schupp and 
Wagner, 2003; Carpenter and Seki, 2005; Brown, Gardner, Oswald, and Qian, 2008) and 
can be seen as a joint test of robustness.  If there are consistent patterns in both types of 
data, we can then have greater confidence in the external validity of laboratory 
experiments. 
Our laboratory experiment extends the standard gift-exchange game between an 
employer and an employee by introducing income comparisons between employees from 
different firms.  The reference group for employees consists of employees in other firms 
participating in the same experimental session. In this between-firm comparison design, 
employees are a priori similar and are thus expected to receive the same equilibrium 
wage.  In the first stage of this game, the employer offers a wage contract.  In the second 
stage, employees who accept the contract decide on their effort level.  In one treatment we 
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can identify income comparisons, as we inform employees, before they choose their effort 
level, about the wages offered by a sub-set of other employers in the labor market.  
Testing the robustness of our experimental results required a dataset with information on 
discretionary effort that closely resembled the experimental design. The survey data come 
from the 1997 wave of the ISSP (International Social Survey Program), which includes 
information on both earnings and self-reported discretionary effort.  The questions asked 
in this survey are extraordinary close to the context of the gift-exchange game, in that the 
employee’s reported effort is explicitly oriented towards improving the firm’s outcome.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly surveys the literature on social 
comparisons, utility and behavior.  Section 3 presents the empirical strategy with respect 
to both the survey and the experimental data.  Section 4 reports the results from both data 
sources, and Section 5 discusses these results and concludes. 
1. Literature 
The existing literature on social comparisons can be broadly divided up into two strands: 
that on behavior and that on utility.  This division can be illustrated by a direct utility 
function: 
Ui=U(ai, aj, ...) for j≠i            (1) 
in which individual i’s utility, Ui, depends on both her own actions and those of relevant 
others, ai and aj.   This utility function most often gives rise to a decision rule for i’s 
utility-maximizing behavior a*i as:  
a*i= f(aj, ....)             (2) 
The behavior and utility approaches to social interactions attempt to find empirical 
counterparts to (2) and (1) respectively. 
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There are a number of drawbacks to the behavioral approach.  First, data on behavior is 
not always particularly accurate.  Second, behavior often reflects the intersection of 
supply and demand, whereas we are interested here in individuals’ preferences.  Lastly, 
under separability conditions1, others’ behavior can affect my own utility, but not my 
behavior.  There are equally problems with the utility approach, via equation (1): in 
particular, we do not necessarily know how to best measure individual utility, Ui. 
Interactions in behavior have been widely modeled econometrically, despite the 
identification problems emphasized by Manski (1993).2  Many of these studies have 
concluded that social interactions do indeed influence behavior, in the sense that ‘if you 
do more of something, then I am likely to do more of it as well’.  One interpretation is that 
this correlation reflects a concern for status or relative standing.  Another is the possibility 
that individuals might be learning from each other about how pleasant or dangerous goods 
or activities are (so that their behaviors are correlated), rather than caring about their 
status.  Rival explanations emphasize the perhaps key role of common omitted variables 
such as contextual effects, although much care is typically exercised in the empirical 
literature to defuse this interpretation.  
An alternative approach to identifying interactions appeals to proxy measures of utility, 
such as life satisfaction, job satisfaction, and happiness (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Clark, 
Frijters, and Shields, 2008).  Perhaps because of a scarcity of surveys which measure both 
proxy utility and behavior adequately, most attention has been concentrated on the role of 
income comparisons in the utility function.  Empirical estimation has thus mostly been 
based on the indirect utility function, Vi, testing specifications such as  
                                                 
1 Formally, d2Ui/daidaj = 0. 
2 Recent contributions in this vein have analyzed saving (Duflo and Saez 2002), tax evasion (Fortin, Lacroix and 
Villeval 2007), labor supply (Aronsson, Blomquist and Sacklén 1999), and students’ success at school 
(Arcidiacono and Nicholson 2005; Sacerdote 2001). 
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Vi=V(yi, yj, ...) for j≠i               (3) 
in which utility depends on own and relevant others’ incomes, yi and yj respectively,  
rather than its direct counterpart (1) above. 
Both the behavior and utility approaches require that the reference group be identified: 
to whom does the individual compare?  There are a number of potential candidates, 
including the individual’s peer group (those who share the same characteristics), others in 
the same household, spouse/partner, friends, neighbors, work colleagues, and the 
individual herself in the past.  
An approach to modeling social comparisons which combines both of the above would 
be to consider i’s behavior, ai, as a function of both her own income and that of her 
reference group, yi and yj: 
ai=a(yi, yj, ...)             (4) 
This can be operationalized empirically as  
ai = A0 + βyi + φyj + γ'Xi + εi           (5) 
The β coefficient in equation (5) shows the extent to which individual behavior, ai, 
depends on own income. If only own income matters in explaining i's behavior, then the 
estimate of φ will be insignificant.  On the other hand, if income comparisons matter for 
behavior then both β and φ will be significant.  If action a is normal then we expect β > 0 
and φ < 0. This is the empirical approach that we take in this paper. 
The behavior we consider here is effort expanded at work: we ask whether workers' 
effort, ei, depends on how much others earn, modeling 
ei=e(yi, y*, ...)             (6) 
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where we expect e1 > 0 but e2 < 0.  Here y* is some transformation of the income vector 
of other people who are in individual i's reference group.  The idea is that individual i has 
a comparison or reference person or group, j, and reduces his or her own input or effort as 
reference income rises, given his or her own wage.  
Much of the efficiency wage literature is based on this idea of the comparison of one’s 
own wage to those of co-workers (Akerlof and Yellen 1990) or of workers in other firms 
(Summers 1988; Johansen and Strøm 2001).3  However, to the extent of our knowledge, 
empirical evidence that workers’ current effort does in fact depend on relative income or 
on own past income remains slight.4    
A recent literature in experimental economics has looked for evidence of social 
comparisons among co-workers.  In the first stage of the game proposed by Charness and 
Kuhn (2007), a principal can propose different wages to her two employees.  These 
employees may have either homogenous or heterogeneous ability levels, but the direction 
and magnitude of these differences are unknown to employees.  In the second stage of the 
game, employees choose their level of effort.  According to the treatment, wages are either 
public or private.  Income comparisons are shown to affect employees’ behavior only 
weakly, whereas firms reduce income differentials between co-workers for fear of low-
effort retaliation from the lower-paid employee.  In other words, firms anticipate a 
negative effect from income comparisons on effort that is not actually observed in 
workers’ behavior.  This wage compression effect was also found by Güth, Königstein, 
Kovacs and Zala-Mezo (2001) in a game in which information about the contracts offered 
                                                 
3 Wage comparisons and effort have also been evoked in the business-cycle literature (Collard and de la Croix, 
2000). 
4 One fascinating exception is Mas (2006), who exploits a natural experiment to consider the relationship 
between relative wages and effort. New Jersey police unions bargain over wages with their municipal employer, 
with disputes being settled by an outside arbitrator. Controlling for the actual pay level awarded, Mas finds that 
12% more crimes per capita are solved (cleared) when unions win their case compared to when they lose. This is 
interpreted as evidence that police effort depends on pay relative to some reference point. By way of contrast, 
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to each employee was manipulated.  They show that principals tend to reduce the income 
differential between agents when contract information is made public.   
In these experiments, productivity differences are introduced between co-workers in 
order to motivate firms to vary their wage offers.  The weak reaction by employees to 
subsequent income comparisons may show that workers consider productivity differences 
to be a fair source of income differentials.  In our experiment, on the contrary, all 
employees have the same productivity, each firm only employs one worker, and income 
differences result from firms’ various choices (and not from any skill differences between 
workers).  Gächter and Thoeni (2005) provide another experimental test using the strategy 
method: subjects are asked to report their effort decision in reaction to various 
hypothetical income distributions.  They identify a large subset of individuals who reduce 
their effort when faced with income inequality.  In our experiment, incomes are actually 
chosen by real firm-subjects, and we infer the influence of income comparisons from 
individuals’ observed effort decisions.  
2. Empirical strategy 
 
Our empirical strategy is based on the joint use of experimental data produced in the 
laboratory and survey data.  The survey data analysis helps to check the external validity 
of the experimental evidence.  When we evoke income comparisons here, we define 
income as the wage offered by the employer to the employee, i.e. we do not take into 
account the cost of effort which will depend on the level of effort chosen by the employee. 
2.1. Experimental Design 
The game.  We identify the impact of income comparisons on effort using a version of the 
standard gift-exchange game (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl 1993).  Each session involves 
                                                                                                                                                        
most of the experimental work on the impact of others’ income tests for inequality aversion and focuses on 
distribution decisions through choices over tax rates, transfers or the distribution of income (see Cowell 2004). 
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twenty subjects who are divided into two groups, ten in the role of firms and ten in the 
role of employees.  Roles are attributed at random and are kept constant throughout the 
session.  All employees have the same characteristics, in contrast to Güth et al. (2001) and 
Charness and Kuhn (2007).  Workers do not differ in ability and thus do not have to form 
beliefs about the relationship between other employees’ productivity and their incomes.  A 
Benchmark Treatment and an Information Treatment were implemented. 
The Benchmark Treatment consists of the standard gift-exchange game.  The use of this 
standard game ensures that our results can be directly compared to those from previous 
experiments before we introduce a new element in the Information Treatment.  In each of 
the ten periods of the game, each firm is matched randomly with an employee.  Each 
period consists of two stages.  
In the first stage, the firm offers a contract consisting of a wage 
 
 to its 
employee.  In the second stage, the employee decides whether to accept or reject the 
contract.  If the contract is rejected, both the firm and the employee receive nothing.  
Upon acceptance, the employee has to choose his level of effort, e .5 The greater 
is the employee’s effort, the higher are the firm’s profits but also the greater is the effort 
cost c(e) borne by the employee.  This effort cost is convex, as shown in Table 1. 
w ∈ 20,120⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
∈ 0.1,1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
In the standard gift-exchange game, the employer’s payoff is: 
π P = v − w( )e  
                                                 
5 It is important to separate these two stages in order to respect the standard gift-exchange game and to check the 
comparability of our results in the Benchmark treatment to those in previous work.  As argued in the literature on 
gift-exchange games, this design allows us to disentangle the effort decision from the job entry decision and to 
analyze whether income comparisons exert the same influence, if any, on both decisions. Combining the 
decision to accept an offer and the choice of effort in one single stage would simplify the design but this requires 
that the decision to accept a contract offer and effort choice be determined in the same way, or that rejecting a 
contract is equivalent to complete shirking on the job. As the results will show, we reject this hypothesis. In any 
case, there is no guarantee that an agent would choose to exert zero effort were she not allowed to reject a 
contract offer.  
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where v is an exogenous redemption value; in our experiment, v=120.  This expression 
guarantees that the firm does not make a loss even if the employee chooses the minimum 
level of effort.  The employee’s payoff is: 
π A = w − c e( )- 20 
with a fixed labor market participation cost of 20 (corresponding to travel costs, say).6   
These payoff functions are common information.  At the end of the period, the firm is 
informed about the level of effort chosen by the employee, and both the firm and the 
employee are informed about their respective payoffs.  In each new period, the pairs of 
firms and employees are randomly reshuffled.  We implement a perfect stranger matching 
protocol in the sense that no agent is matched with any principal more than once, and this 
is common information from the instructions.  This allows us to rule out any reputation-
building behavior (Gächter and Falk 2002). 
The Information Treatment has the same structure.  The difference lies in the fact that at 
the end of the first stage, after the firm’s income offer is revealed, the employee is told 
about the income offers received from their firms by four other employees in the same 
period.  Employees can thus compare their own income to the income offered to other a 
priori similar employees on the labor market (but not co-workers) before rejecting or 
accepting the contract, and thus before choosing effort. We choose to display only partial 
information about other income offers (in each period, four other randomly-chosen 
income offers, instead of the whole distribution) to produce a greater variety of income 
distributions within the reference group.  In addition, this procedure allows the relative 
income effect to be identified separately from any period effect.  In contrast to the 
employee, the firm is not informed about the other firms’ income policies.  This reduces 
                                                 
6 This fixed cost, which has to be covered by firm’s wage offer, exists only to avoid having a minimum wage of 
zero in the set of firm’s actions; it has no implications for the theoretical predictions of the game.  
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the likelihood that firms behave in a different way in the two treatments.  This is justified 
by the fact that we are mainly interested in the comparison between employees. 
Equilibrium of the game.  The equilibrium of this game with selfish and rational players 
is a minimum wage – minimum effort pair of decisions, [w=20, e=0.1].  The minimum 
wage contract should be accepted since the employee has no better alternative.  Equally, 
the employee should accept the contract and choose the same (minimum) effort level in 
both treatments since the incomes offered by other firms do not enter into the standard 
individual utility function.  Firms should thus offer the same (minimum) income in both 
treatments. 
However, it is possible that, in both treatments, income and effort be above their 
theoretically-predicted levels.  The existing literature has shown that employees typically 
reciprocate high (low) income offers by choosing high (low) effort levels that increase 
(decrease) the firm’s payoff (Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger, 1997).7  In addition, 
information about the income distribution may affect effort in the Information Treatment 
if individuals are sufficiently sensitive to income comparisons.  If subjects make 
horizontal comparisons (i.e. among employees), we may expect effort to be positively 
correlated with both relative income and income rank.  On the contrary, as firms are never 
informed about the income distribution, there is no reason why their behavior should 
differ across treatments.8 
Procedures.  The experiment was conducted in the experimental laboratory at GATE, 
Lyon, France, using the Regate software (Zeiliger 2000).  A total of 120 undergraduate 
students, from three local Engineering and Business schools, participated in one of the six 
                                                 
7 One might argue that individuals may also reciprocate higher income rank and higher relative income with 
higher effort in the Information Treatment. However, in our experiment, firms were never informed about the 
income distribution. As a consequence, ranking can not be considered as intentional on the part of the employer. 
In any case, employees would presumably only reciprocate relative income if it were valuable to them, which is 
exactly what we want to demonstrate. 
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sessions organized.  Two of these concerned the Benchmark Treatment and four the 
Information Treatment.  No-one participated in more than one session.  Upon arrival, the 
subjects drew a label from an envelope, indicating the name of their computer.  The 
instructions (see the Appendix) were distributed and read aloud.  The subjects then filled 
out a questionnaire that allowed us to check their understanding of the rules of the game.  
Questions were answered in private. 
The subjects subsequently discovered their role (firm or employee).  The program 
paired firms and employees randomly and anonymously.  As the game was repeated 10 
times under a perfect stranger matching protocol, each firm made an income offer to each 
of the employees.  This yields a total of 200 wage offers in the Benchmark Treatment and 
400 wage offers in the Information Treatment. Each employee made 10 contract-
acceptance decisions and, if the contract was accepted, chose an effort level.  The next 
section concentrates on the analysis of these effort decisions. 
Each session lasted one hour on average, including the payment that was carried out in 
a separate room.  The experiment was conducted in experimental currency units with 100 
points equal to 4 Euros.  Each subject earned on average €14 from the experiment, 
including a show-up fee of €4.  This indicates that in each period, the subjects earned on 
average €1. 
Compared with survey data, this experimental approach presents many advantages: 
income is perfectly measured, effort is observed directly instead of being self-reported, 
and the reference group is controlled.  However, the artificiality of the laboratory may cast 
doubts on the external validity of the experimental results.  For these reasons, we 
complement our experimental analysis with survey evidence on income and effort. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 A firm cannot know whether a lack of reciprocity is due to comparisons or to the employee’s selfishness. 
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2.2. Survey Data on Work Effort 
The survey data, multi-country and cross-section, come from the 1997 Work Orientations 
module of the International Social Survey Programme, the ISSP (the data and 
documentation are freely available from http://www.issp.org).  The key variables in our 
empirical analysis are effort, earnings and hours of work.  Income is measured as 
individual yearly labor market earnings, converted to U.S. Dollars using Purchasing 
Power Parities from the OECD.  Hours of work are measured at the weekly level.  
The variable we wish to explain is effort at work. This is almost never observed directly 
in survey data.  To compare our experimental evidence to (larger-scale) survey data, we 
require a survey in which employees report their willingness to exert effort in order to 
improve their employer’s outcome, as in the experimental set-up where the employee 
provides extra effort at his own cost in order to increase her employer’s earnings.  The 
question we appeal to in the ISSP data is crafted to measure discretionary effort, and is 
thus arguably well-suited to our analysis.  All those in employment are asked to indicate 
the extent to which they agree with a number of statements.  One of these is: “I am willing 
to work harder than I have to in order to help the firm or organization I work for to 
succeed”.9  This question is remarkably close to the context of the gift exchange game, in 
which any level of effort above the minimum is voluntary and increases the firms’ profit, 
but decreases the employee’s payoff.  It may seem reasonable to assume that that “helping 
the firm to succeed” in the survey data is analogous to improving its payoff, and 
conversely that increasing the firm’s earnings in the experiment is comparable to helping 
it to succeed. 
                                                 
9 This is similar to variables used in Management to capture organizational commitment: see Jaworski and Kohli 
(1993).  It could also, of course, reflect the employee’s effort to prevent the firm going bankrupt; however, even 
in this context, employees provide costly effort in order to improve the firm’s outcome. 
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The weighted distribution of the five possible responses to this question in the 1997 
ISSP is shown below in percentages. 
Strongly agree      16.7% 
Agree       42.4% 
Neither agree nor disagree    24.2% 
Disagree                  12.0% 
Strongly disagree                             4.5% 
 
 Keeping only full-time or part-time employees aged 16-65 yields a sample of 12 000 
observations over 17 countries (considering the two Germanies separately).  Missing 
values on earnings, hours of work and effort finally produce a regression sample of around 
10 000 observations. 
We are interested in describing differences in the response to the effort question 
between individuals.  A first pass is to look at the cross-country pattern in discretionary 
effort.  To do so, we allocate a value of 5 to “strongly agree” through to a value of 1 for 
“strongly disagree” to the question described above.  Table 2 shows the number of 
observations and mean effort, ranked by country from the lowest to the highest average 
effort.
There is something of a country pattern in the degree of social reciprocity at work.  
Mediterranean countries are broadly towards the bottom of this ranking, while workers in 
Anglo-Saxon countries are on average more willing to work hard to help their firm or 
organization.  Portugal is an exception to this general rule, appearing towards the top of 
the ranking.10 
                                                 
10 There is a strong correlation between unemployment and the mean of this effort variable.  The average OECD 
standardised unemployment rate in 1997 of the lowest seven countries in the ranking was 12.3%, as against 5.9% 
for the ten highest-ranked.  Both the Pearson and Spearman correlations between mean effort and the 
unemployment rate are significant at better than the 2% level.  One interpretation is that social reciprocity allows 
firms and employees to attain Pareto-superior employment outcomes. 
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The main thrust of our paper is, conditional on country, to see how workers’ 
discretionary effort is related to individual demographic and job characteristics.  We are 
especially interested in the role of income.  We control for individual income and hours of 
work, but also for reference group income.  This latter is defined in a similar way to that 
in the Leyden school: by calculating average values of income over fairly broad 
demographic groups,11 here country, gender, education and age.  There are three education 
groups (up to 10 years of education, 11-13 years of education, and over 13 years of 
education), and three age groups (16-29, 30-44, and 45-65).  There are thus 17 (country) * 
2 (sex) * 3 (education) * 3 (age) = 306 reference groups.  These average income measures 
are called comparison income in the regression tables, and correspond to y* in equation 
(6) above.12  Comparison income for individual i in cell j is calculated excluding i’s own 
income. 
3. Results 
Effort may be influenced by own income, by relative income or income rank, or by the 
income the individual received in the past if there are intertemporal comparisons. We 
estimate discretionary effort equations on both experimental and survey data to determine 
whether income comparisons affect individual effort behavior.   
3.1 Effort and comparisons to others 
The average wage offered by firms in the experiment is 53.51 (Standard Deviation 19.7) 
in the Benchmark Treatment and 53.09 (S.D. 20.0) in the Information Treatment (where 
wage offers are constrained to lie between 20 and 120).  Both average figures are clearly 
above the equilibrium wage of 20 (one-tailed t-test, p<.0001) but are not significantly 
                                                 
11 See for example van de Stadt, Kapteyn, and van de Geer (1985).  
12 This cell-average approach does not suffer from the identification problems which occur when y* is predicted 
in a regression framework, as the cell-average income is not a linear function of the X variables (the variables 
which define the cells – here country, age, gender and education). 
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different from each other.  Firms do anticipate reciprocity from their employees, but they 
do not change their wage offers when income comparisons appear. 
Two different specifications of comparison income are used.  The first is normalized 
rank, defined as: rank in cell or group / number of observations in cell or group, with a 
correction for ties.  This is a measure of how the individual’s income is ranked relative to 
the other members of the reference group in the Information Treatment and in the ISSP 
survey data (and not relative to all individuals).  In the experimental data, the rank 
determines the position of the subject relative to the four other group members for whom 
wage information was revealed.  This measure is bounded between just over zero for the 
bottom-ranked income in the cell to one for the top-ranked income.  The second 
comparison measure is average reference group income, excluding the individual’s own 
income.  Average and individual earnings levels are expressed in experimental currency 
units in the experimental data, and in thousands of U.S. Dollars per month in the ISSP 
data.   
We estimate the influence of income comparisons on effort in the experimental data 
via random effects Tobits. The use of Tobit models is justified by the number of left-
censored observations in the sample.  Table 3 displays the distribution of effort levels and 
mean income per effort level.  It shows that minimum effort  (i.e. 0.1) was chosen 98 
times out of 180 in accepted contracts (54.4%) in the Benchmark Treatment, and 214 
times out of 378 in accepted contracts (56.6%) in the Information Treatment.13  Not taking 
this data censoring into account would likely bias the coefficients. 
                                                 
13 If we consider individuals instead of decisions, we observe that only a minority of subjects behave selfishly.  
Defining as selfish individuals those subjects who choose the minimum effort in at least 8 periods out of 10, we 
have 35% of selfish people in the Benchmark and 27.5% in the Information Treatment.  We cannot however 
determine whether this difference is inherent to the very nature of the subjects involved in the two treatments or 
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Table 3 indicates a positive relationship between income and effort in both 
experimental treatments.  This is typically observed in the gift-exchange game (Fehr, 
Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997), and is consistent with social motivations leading to 
reciprocity. While the income-effort relationship looks somewhat steeper in the 
Information Treatment, the joint presence of income and comparison income makes such 
bivariate conclusions untrustworthy. 
The main effort regression results using the experimental data are shown in Table 4, 
and those based on the ISSP survey data in Table 5.  Table 4 consists of two panels.  The 
left panel displays the results of six regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
effort choice of subjects who accepted a contract offer.  The right panel, which we will 
discuss below, presents the results of alternative specifications that check the robustness 
of the results. Most regressions are estimated as Tobits, which account for both left- and 
right-censoring (the first of which is endemic in our data).   In addition, since each subject 
is observed a number of times (up to 10 times if the subject accepts all the contract offers), 
we appeal to panel data methods, and estimate all of the regressions in the left-hand panel 
with random effects.  In the Benchmark (Information) Treatment, 20 (22) contracts were 
rejected.  Our left-hand panel sample thus consists of 180 effort decisions in the 
Benchmark Treatment and 378 in the Information Treatment. 
Regressions (1) and (3) consider the role of own income in the Benchmark and 
Information Treatments, respectively.  Regressions (2) and (4) add normalized income 
rank as an explanatory variable: higher values of this rank variable correspond to higher 
positions in the reference group income distribution.  Since subjects are not informed 
about their income rank in the Benchmark Treatment, this “placebo” variable should be 
insignificant there, except if income and rank are strongly collinear.  The last two 
                                                                                                                                                        
if it is attributable to the dissemination of income information.  If the latter, some fraction of minimum effort 
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regressions in the left-hand panel refer to the Information Treatment only.  Regression (5) 
replaces income rank by average reference group earnings (excluding own income), and 
regression (6) includes both income rank and average group earnings.  All of the 
experimental effort regressions control for both gender and number of post-baccalaureat 
years of education. 
Table 5 reports the results of four analogous estimations on the ISSP survey data, in 
which the dependent variable is the degree of willingness to work harder to help the 
company or organization to succeed. Each individual is observed only once and we have 
9854 observations. Ordered Probit regressions are estimated as the survey effort question 
allows five ordered responses.  We follow the same logic as for the experimental data: 
regression (1) includes own income only; regression (2) adds normalized income rank; 
regression (3) replaces rank by comparison income; and regression (4) estimates the joint 
influence of own income, rank and average reference group income.  We also control for 
hours of work, age, gender, education and marital status, and include country dummies. 
The standard errors in this Table are clustered at the reference group level.14  
The results in Tables 4 and 5 show that effort is strongly correlated with own absolute 
income at the 1% level in both treatments of the experimental data and in the survey data.  
Regressions (4) in Table 4 and (2) in Table 5 reveal the influence of others’ income: 
normalized income rank attracts a positive and significant coefficient conditional on own 
income.  For the same number of Dollars/experimental units earned, individuals are 
willing to work harder the higher is their position in the reference group income 
                                                                                                                                                        
decisions are motivated by social comparisons rather than selfishness.  
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distribution.  Unsurprisingly, normalized income rank is insignificant in the Benchmark 
Treatment (regression 2 in Table 4), where individuals are unaware of their rank.  In the 
experiment (column 4), a rise in rank of one position (out of five) increases effort by 0.57 
(=0.20*2.87), which is equivalent to a wage increase of 6.52 for given rank.  Compared to 
average income per period (53.09), this latter represents a wage rise of 12.3%. The 
rank/income elasticity is thus 0.614 (=12.29/20).  In the survey data, a 20% rank increase 
has the same effect on effort as an extra $623 per month, which is 33% of average income, 
yielding a rank/income elasticity of 1.6.  This higher elasticity may reflect the wider 
distribution of income in the survey data, the fact that rank matters more “in real life”, or 
that rank is more important when reputation-building is possible.   
The experimental evidence thus points to income position within the reference group as 
being an important determinant of how much discretionary effort workers provide, over 
and above the actual income they receive, which latter has been the focus of the literature 
to date.  This is confirmed by the survey data analysis.15  This, to our knowledge, is one of 
only a small number of empirical findings pointing to relative income and status as a 
determinant of employees’ behavior. 
In regressions (5) in Table 4 and (3) in Table 5, average income in the reference group 
attracts a negative coefficient, which is significant only for the experimental data.  If we 
include both normalized rank and reference earnings in the same regression (column (6) in 
Table 4 and column (4) in Table 5), this marginally significant effect disappears, whereas 
the coefficients associated with rank remain positive and significant.  Our second key 
result is therefore that ordinal comparisons, as measured by normalized rank in the income 
                                                                                                                                                        
14 Income is entered in levels. Entering all of the cardinal income variables as logs produces similar results, but is 
not preferred by the data (the log likelihood is lower). 
15 The ISSP results are largely unchanged when we drop the 20% of observations which are found in reference 
groups with 30 observations or less, or if we use a less aggregated reference group by dropping education, or 
age. 
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distribution, are a more powerful predictor of employee behavior than are cardinal 
comparisons, i.e. from others’ earnings expressed in currency units.16  
Other results in Table 4 show that in the experimental data, gender and education have 
a marginally significant negative effect on effort in the Benchmark Treatment but no 
significant impact in the Information Treatment.  In the ISSP data, controlling for rank or 
average income, effort is higher for men, the married and the higher-educated.  The 
difference between the experimental and the ISSP data may reflect the far smaller 
variance in the demographic variables in the student subject-pool than in the ISSP data.  
Last, the estimates on the country dummies in the ISSP regressions (not shown) largely 
reproduce the effort ranking in Table 1. 
3.2  Robustness checks 
To check the robustness of our experimental results, we have considered a number of 
alternative specifications, some of which are reported in the right-hand panel of Table 4.  
For the sake of simplicity, we only report the estimations including both own wage and 
normalized rank.   
First, columns (7) and (8) reproduce columns (4) and (6), but allowing for a less 
restrictive form of correlation between error terms at the individual level than random 
effects. The estimation method here is a Tobit with clustered standard errors at the 
individual level.  Similar estimations with clustered standard errors have been carried out 
for each of the previous models.  The main message from these regressions is that the 
results in the left-hand panel of Table 4 are unaffected by this clustering. Clustering 
                                                 
16 This result concurs with that in Brown, Gardner, Oswald and Qian (2008), where income rank is shown to 
outperform average reference group income in three satisfaction equations (influence over the job, achievement, 
and supervisor’s respect).  For the fourth dependent variable, satisfaction with pay, both rank and reference 
group income attract significant coefficients. 
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increases the standard errors, but both own income and rank remain significant in columns 
(7) and (8). 
The main results reported above were based only on those subjects who accepted a 
contract (and consequently reported an effort level). Alternatively we can include those 
who rejected the contract, imagining that they would have provided zero effort.  In this 
case, no observations are excluded. We thus estimate in column (9) a random effects Tobit 
model in which the left-censoring is set at effort level 0 rather than 0.1; column (10) 
shows the equivalent estimates from random effects Generalized Least Squares 
estimation. Both regressions use all 400 observations, as opposed to 378 previously.  We 
find that, controlling for absolute income, rank continues to exert a significant effect on 
effort.   
These regressions are based on the strong assumption that rank affects the decision to 
reject an offer and the choice of minimum (but positive) effort to the same degree.  To test 
this hypothesis, we next estimate a random effects Probit for the decision to accept an 
offer, with the same explanatory variables as previously: the results are shown in column 
(11).  The probability of accepting an offer depends on the absolute wage proposed, but is 
not affected by income rank.  A potential explanation is that contract acceptance is a blunt 
decision, while there is more latitude in effort choice.  It is therefore important to respect 
the sequential structure in the gift-exchange game separating offer acceptance from the 
choice of effort.  This also explains why treating offer rejection as the choice of zero effort 
reduces the significance of rank (from the 1% to the 5% level).    
Bearing this in mind, we proceed to an alternative two-step estimation procedure that 
respects the sequential nature of the game in order to correct for any selection bias from 
the exclusion of the observations corresponding to the rejected contracts.  We first 
consider the random effects Probit estimated in column (11) as a selection equation, 
 23
producing the inverse of the Mill’s ratio (IMR).  We then explain effort, conditional on 
contract acceptance, corrected for selection bias via the introduction of the IMR as an 
explanatory variable.  This second equation is estimated as a random effects Generalized 
Least Squares with clustered standard errors in column (12), and as random effects Tobit 
(which we prefer, given the importance of left-censoring) in column (13).  Both 
specifications show that rank continues to affect effort (at the 5% significance level).  The 
results from GLS estimation suggest that a rise in income rank of one place (for example 
4th to 3rd), which corresponds to a rise in the rank variable of 0.2, will increase effort by 
two to three ticks on the ten-point (0.1-1) scale, as 0.2*1.235=0.25. 
The robustness checks therefore all deliver the same conclusion: regardless of the form 
of the correlation between the error terms at the individual level (random effects or 
clustered), and regardless of the way in which contract rejection is treated, individual 
effort is sensitive to income rank.17 
3.3 Effort and comparison income across groups 
Our main results in Tables 4 and 5 concern average effects over all individuals in the 
sample. However, we may suspect that certain groups react to relative income in different 
ways. In particular, based on recent experimental evidence on the impact of gender on 
competition or social preferences, we consider whether the impact of rank on effort is 
different for men and women in both the experimental and the survey data.  
The experimental results in Table 4 include interactions between “Male” and both own 
income and income rank. The estimated coefficients on these interactions are always 
                                                 
17 We have also estimated models using the Chamberlain procedure (results available upon request).  More 
specifically, we add Xi  (the average individual rank of the individual in all previous periods) to the random 
effects Tobit model.  Our results remain unchanged.   Equally, Generalized Least Squares with fixed effects 
yields similar conclusions.  
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insignificant, showing that men and women react to income similarly in determining their 
effort choice. An alternative way of looking at sex differences in the experimental is 
shown in the first panel of Table 6, where separate regressions are run for men and for 
women. We lose some significance here, due to the smaller sample size, but again the size 
of the estimated coefficients is similar by sex. 
The ISSP survey sample is more heterogeneous, allowing a number of different 
scenarios to be tested. As well as gender, we can here consider a potential role for the 
environment in which wages and effort are decided. We consider potential moderating 
effects of union membership, sector (public vs. private), and managerial status. The 
regressions in Table 5 are run separately for each of these different groups. In the case of 
union, sector and manager, the reference group is redefined according to the respective 
variables (so that managers consider their rank amongst other managers); the reference 
group is already defined by sex.  
The estimated coefficients on the income terms from specifications (2) and (3) in Table 
5 are shown in the bottom part of Table 6, for the eight sub-groups under consideration. 
First, as in the experimental data, there are no sharp differences between men and women. 
Income rank attracts a positive coefficient for both groups, although significant only at 
just outside the ten per cent level, due to smaller sample sizes, while the estimated 
coefficient on average income in the reference group is negative but very insignificant.  
The third panel considers union status, and here differences do arise. Effort for non-
union workers is related to own income only, with no role for income comparisons. Effort 
for union workers is very sensitive to income rank, perhaps indicating the key role of 
wage fairness in union negotiations. The fourth panel reveals little difference in the 
qualitative effort results between the public and private sectors. Last, the effort of workers 
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in non-supervisory positions is only affected by their own income. However, workers with 
managerial responsibilities are sensitive to income comparisons, particularly in terms of 
income rank.  
While Table 6 does show that effort for some groups of workers is more sensitive to 
income comparisons than for others, it is worth noting that in the ISSP data, “comparison 
income”, the average Dollar amount earned by others in the reference group, is 
insignificant in all of the eight groups considered. Comparisons continue to be ordinal 
rather than cardinal. 
3.4 Effort and comparisons over time 
The results so far have discussed the relationship between others’ income and own effort.  
We now turn to comparisons to the income that the individual herself received in the past.  
The broad idea is that past exposure to higher incomes may reduce the utility associated 
with current incomes and thus decrease the current level of effort.  This hypothesis has 
been tested with measures of satisfaction in panel data (see Clark 1999; Weinzierl 2005) 
but, as far as we know, not with measures of behavior such as effort.  In parallel, a 
separate literature has developed on time-inseparability in behaviors such as consumption 
and labor supply. 
One difficulty in these literatures has been to ensure that ceteris paribus holds over the 
long time-periods between waves of survey data.  Experimental data are ideally-suited to 
testing models of habituation since we impose the same environment over time, especially 
in the perfect-stranger framework where there is no role for reputation building.  We 
therefore investigate the role of previous income in determining current levels of effort, by 
estimating random effects Tobit models on the experimental data only.  The dependent 
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variable is the choice of effort conditional on contract acceptance.  Our a priori is that 
higher past income will reduce current effort, as past income acts as a benchmark.   
We pick up the effect of past income by including running maximum income and 
running minimum income as additional explanatory variables.  We thus ask whether effort 
at time t depends on the highest (lowest) income the individual had been offered up to and 
including time t.  We carry out an analogous analysis with respect to rank to determine 
whether effort is influenced more by past income or by past income rank.  This running 
maximum/minimum specification is inspired by the peak-end transformation, which has 
been used to model how a flow of pain is converted into a final global evaluation 
(Redelmeier and Kahneman 1996).18  The period dummies in this regression pick up the 
fact that the running minimum (maximum) mechanically weakly decreases (increases) 
over time, and avoid any spurious correlation between running minimum and maximum 
and the dependent variable.  The usual demographic variables are also included.  The 
results appear in Table 7.  
 
Table 7 shows that the past matters: for a given income and a given income rank, effort 
is significantly lower the higher is the most generous income offer received in the past 
(regression (1)), and the higher is the best income rank achieved in the past (regression 
(2)).  In contrast, running minimum income and running minimum rank do not influence 
the current level of effort.  This suggests that high past income and income rank are used 
as benchmarks with which to evaluate the current offer’s generosity, and thus the degree 
of reciprocity.  Regression (3) compares the influence of the two past income measures.  
The best past rank in the income distribution (significant at the 2% level) matters more 
than best past absolute income, which is itself borderline significant (12%).  The 
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insignificance of the interaction between gender and rank shows that, as above, men and 
women react to rank in the same way. 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
Evidence for the role of status or comparisons in determining behavior remains elusive.  
In this paper we have looked for effects of income comparisons on discretionary work 
effort in experimental data.  We then compare the experimental findings to results from 
large-scale survey data.  We have three key findings.  
First, effort at work depends both on the individual’s own income, and on what others 
earn, both in the experimental and survey data.  Our results thus contribute to the still 
small literature showing that comparisons affect behavior via actual costly decisions and 
not only self-reported well-being.  We further believe this to be one of the first papers to 
combine experimental and survey data to do so. 
Second, income rank (i.e. first, second, … in the relevant distribution) is a better 
predictor of effort decisions than is average reference group income.  As such, 
comparisons are ordinal rather than cardinal. 
Last, in the experimental data, the income profile over time matters in itself.  Those 
who received higher income or higher income rank in the past supply less effort today, at 
a given current income and income rank.  This result is potentially important for 
understanding for example the frequent failure of mergers.  While the literature has 
concentrated on the role of income, mergers may involve substantial changes in rank as 
well; we have shown the latter to be a strong determinant of motivation.  
There are a number of explanations of the rank-sensitivity of effort.  We have presented 
our results in terms of income comparisons and concern for status.  Alternatively, effort 
                                                                                                                                                        
18 Data from period 1 are dropped as income (income rank) and running maximum/minimum income 
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choice may derive from inequality-aversion (see for example Fehr and Schmidt 1999): 
those who receive a high income increase their effort so as to reduce the difference 
between their own earnings (i.e. income minus effort cost) and those of lower (and 
particularly the lowest) income workers.  While it is difficult to distinguish cleanly 
between theories, we note that inequality-aversion would predict a stronger effort role for 
others’ incomes than for income rank, whereas in both experimental and survey data we 
find the opposite.  Also inequality-aversion does not explain the role of past income and 
income rank in explaining current effort, whereas income comparisons do.   
Another alternative explanation of our results is that workers learn what the “fair 
income” is in the group: in this case, their effort does not depend on within-period 
comparisons as such, but on the search for the norm and learning.  Subjects learn 
progressively how their current firm’s behavior compares to that of other firms; this 
would also explain why past wages negatively affect current effort, everything else being 
equal.  As such, our regressions might capture a comparison effect based on learning.  
Although the subjects likely do learn the average wage over time, we do not believe that 
this learning entirely replaces the rank effect, for a number of reasons.  First, if we were 
observing learning in the experiment, employees should reject more offers over time as 
they learn what the fair income is, and should reject more contracts in the Information 
Treatment than in the Benchmark Treatment.  Neither of these predictions holds.  Second, 
if only learning is present, income rank should be insignificant, or should at least be less 
important than the reference income within the group.  However, reference income in the 
experiment is less significant than is rank, and when we include both variables in the 
regression at the same time, only rank remains significant.  In the survey data, reference 
income is never significant.  Last, in the experiment, the employees should also care about 
                                                                                                                                                        
(income rank) necessarily coincide in this period.  The period dummies therefore refer to periods 3 to 10. 
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both own best and worst wages in the past, which is not the case.  As such, we believe that 
an interpretation in terms of rank and status-seeking is the most consistent with all of our 
experimental and survey findings. 
One general implication of our work is that combining experiments in a controlled 
environment and survey analysis, based on subjective data, serves as a validation exercise.  
While both approaches have been criticized for separate reasons, here they produce 
remarkably similar and consistent results about the importance of income rank on effort 
decisions.  Another validation procedure would consist of asking the experimental 
subjects to perform a real effort task instead of picking numbers from a table.  This would 
constitute a natural extension of this paper. 
Over 20 years ago, Bob Frank (1985) suggested that firms can trade off status and 
wages.  In the context of between-firm comparisons, this paper has shown that these two 
are indeed substitutes in terms of inciting worker effort.  Worker effort is lower in the face 
of both absolutely and relatively low incomes, where this relativity concerns both others 
in the same period and oneself in previous periods.  This may explain why firms favor 
income secrecy, and also why the same income at a point in time might produce different 
effort levels.  The results also demonstrate the concrete advantage accruing to firms 
paying rising income profiles.  More generally, income comparisons, both to others and to 
oneself in the past, seem to be a pervasive element of economic life.
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Appendix: Experimental Instructions in the Information treatment 
General information 
 
You are going to participate in an experiment on the labor market for the MiRE- Ministry of Social Affairs. 
If you read these instructions carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money. The amount of your 
earnings depends not only on your decisions, but also on the decisions of the other participants you will 
interact with. During this session, your earnings will be calculated in points, with  
100 points = 4 Euros 
At the end of the session, all the profits you have made in each period will be added up and converted into 
Euros. In addition, you will receive a show-up fee of 4 Euros. Your earnings will be paid to you in cash in a 
separate room in order to preserve confidentiality.  
At the beginning of the session, each of the 20 participants will be assigned one of two roles: 10 participants 
will be “employees” and 10 participants will be “firms”. Your computer screen will inform you about your 
role. You will keep the same role throughout the session. You will never be informed of the identity of the 
participants you will interact with.  
The labor market consists of 10 periods. 
 
Decision-making in each period 
 
Each period consists of two stages. 
- In the first stage, each firm is paired randomly and anonymously with an employee. Each firm makes a 
income offer to his employee. The employee is informed of the income offer made by his firm and he is 
also informed of the income offers made by 4 other firms randomly chosen in the room.  
The employee can accept to work for the income offered by his firm or not to accept his firm’s offer. If 
the employee accepts the offer, he proceeds to the second stage. 
- In the second stage, the employees who have accepted an offer must decide on their quantity of work. 
The details of the procedure are explained below. 
 
Please note that in each new period, the firm-employee pairs are reshuffled. You are sure not to interact 
more than once with the same firm or with the same employee if you are a firm. 
 
Information about the labor market in each period 
 
1. At the beginning of the period, the firm makes an offer to the employee. This income is between 20 and 
120 points. Information about this income offer will be communicated to 4 other employees.  
2. The employee is informed about both the income offer made by his firm and the income offers made by 
4 other firms to their employees. These firms are chosen randomly. 
3. The employee can accept the offer from his firm and work. He can reject the offer and, in this case, he 
does not work: both he and the firm earn nothing for the current period. Only the firm is informed about 
the acceptance or the rejection of his offer by his employee. 
4. If the employee has accepted the income offer, he receives his income and must decide on his quantity 
of work. The firm is informed about this quantity of work but neither other firms nor other employees 
are informed about it. The employee must bear a transportation cost of 20 points. 
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How are payoffs in each period determined? 
The employee’s payoff 
1. If the employee has rejected his firm’s offer, his payoff is zero for the period. 
2. If the employee has accepted his firm’s offer, the employee receives his income. He must subtract from 
this income both a transportation cost of 20 points and the cost associated with the quantity of work he 
has chosen. 
3. The employee determines his quantity of work in choosing a number in between .1 and 1, as indicated 
in the Table below. The smallest quantity of work is .1 and the largest is 1. The higher the number 
chosen, the greater the quantity of work, and the higher the firm’s payoff. 
4. The greater the quantity of work chosen, the higher is the associated cost to the employee. The Table 
below shows how costs vary with the quantity of work. 
5. In the case that the income offer is accepted, the employee’s payoff in points is determined as follows: 
Employee’s payoff in points in each period = 
Income – cost of the quantity of work – transportation cost 
 
Transportation cost = 20 points 
Relationship between the quantity of work and the associated cost 
 
Quantity of 
work 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 
Associated 
cost 
0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
The employer’s payoff 
1. At the beginning of each period, the firm receives 120 coupons from the experimenter that can be used 
to pay the income of the current period. If the firm offers a income of 120 points to his employee and if 
this offer is accepted, then the firm has no coupons left. If the firm offers a income of 20 points to his 
employee and if this employee accepts this offer, then he has 100 coupons left. More generally, the firm 
keeps:  
120 coupons – the income paid to the employee 
2. How are the remaining coupons converted into points? The number of coupons kept by the firm is 
multiplied by the quantity of work chosen by the employee. The result indicates the firm’s payoff in 
points for the current period. Then, 
Firm’s payoff in points in each period = 
(number of coupons – income) * quantity of work 
 
3. If the employee does not accept his offer, the firm loses its coupons and its payoff is zero for the current 
period. 
At the end of the period, the firm and his employee are informed about their respective payoffs. 
At the end of each period, the next starts automatically. The firms and the employees are re-matched 
randomly to form new pairs.  
Throughout the entire session, you are not allowed to talk if not invited to do so. Any violation of this rule 
will result in being excluded from the session and not receiving payment. If you have any questions 
regarding these instructions, please raise your hand. Your questions will be answered in private. 
 
-------------------------- 
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Table 1. The cost of effort in the experiment 
 
Effort e 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
Cost c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
 
Table 2. Mean Discretionary Effort by Country: ISSP 1997. 
 
Employees 
interviewed  
 
Country 
No. % 
Mean Effort 
USA 775 6.47 3.93 
Canada 546 4.55 3.75 
Portugal 843 7.03 3.71 
Switzerland   1 727   14.41 3.65 
Denmark 600 5.01 3.64 
Great Britain 545 4.55 3.63 
Japan 607 5.06 3.62 
Hungary 626 5.22 3.60 
Czech Republic 526 4.39 3.60 
Norway   1 366   11.40 3.59 
East Germany 261 2.18 3.59 
West Germany 648 5.41 3.52 
Sweden 793 6.62 3.42 
Spain 387 3.23 3.35 
Poland 564 4.71 3.26 
Italy 475 3.96 2.96 
France 698 5.82 2.85 
Total 11 987 100.00 3.55 
 
Note: The question is “I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help the firm or organization I 
work for to succeed”, with responses coded from 5 for “strongly agree” through to 1 for “strongly 
disagree”. 
 
Table 3.  Average income and effort levels in accepted contracts 
Effort level 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 Total 
Benchmark 
 Number obs. 
 (%) 
 Mean income 
 
98 
 (54) 
50.9 
 
22  
(12) 
50.1 
 
16 
(9) 
61.5
 
12 
 (7) 
64.1 
 
11 
 (6) 
69.7 
 
9  
(5) 
71.1 
 
4 
 (2) 
71.3 
 
5 
 (3) 
80.0 
 
2 
 (1) 
95.0 
 
1  
(1) 
60.0 
 
180 
(100) 
53.5 
Information 
 Number obs.      
(%) 
 Mean income 
 
214 
(57) 
44.4 
 
45 
(12) 
59.2 
 
32 
(8) 
65.4
 
29 
(8) 
64.0 
 
13 
(3) 
69.6 
 
18 
(5) 
75.6 
 
13 
(3) 
80.8 
 
8 
(2) 
79.4 
 
0 
(0) 
0 
 
6 
(2) 
93.3 
 
378 
(100) 
53.1 
 
 Regression models Robustness tests 
Treatments 
 
Benchmark Treatment                     Information Treatment Information Treatment 
Dependent Variables Effort in accepted contracts Effort in accepted contracts Effort for all offers Acceptance Effort in accepted contracts 
  
  RE Tobita  RE Tobit  RE Tobit  RE Tobit  RE Tobit  RE Tobit Tobit with clustered SE   RE Tobit RE GLSb RE Probit  RE GLS 
with 
clustered S.E.
RE Tobit Models 
(1)    (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Own Income 0.106*** c 0.085*** 0.121*** 0.088*** 0.117*** 0.091*** 0.093*** 0.112*** 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.144*** 0.45*** 0.088*** 
  (0.017) d (0.026) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.008) (0.008) (0.044) (0.010) (0.015) 
Income Rank  1.349  2.871***  2.401** 2.792** 2.235* 1.193** 1.029** 0.997 1.235* 2.886*** 
   (1.396)  (1.038)  (1.143) (1.260) (1.359) (0.537) (0.519) (1.260) (0.717) (1.047) 
Comparison      -0.034** -0.019   0.026       
  Income     (0.017) (0.019)   (0.029)       
Male -3.231* -3.875* -1.248 -1.161 -1.389 -1.243 -0.774 -0.729 0.034 0.001  -0.205 -1.158 
  (1.963) (2.014) (1.377) (1.362) (1.374) (1.365) (1.631) (1.710) (0.540) (0.537)  (0.666) (1.360) 
0.0313 0.024 0.015 0.039 0.016 0.042 0.048 0.075 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.039 Male*Income 
(0.024) (0.035) (0.017) (0.029) (0.016) (0.029) (0.046) (0.048) (0.014) (0.013) 
 
(0.020) (0.029) 
1.469 -2.209 -2.382 -3.019 -5.016 -1.118 -1.105 -0.952 -2.209 Male*Rank   
(2.326) 
 
(1.977) 
 
(1.986) (2.842) (2.854) (0.943) (0.914) 
 
(1.006) (1.975) 
Years of  1.284 1.277 0.044 0.045 0.071 0.061 -0.173 -0.106 -0.168 -0.162  -0.153 0.046 
  Education (0.850) (0.851) (0.403) (0.401) (0.400) (0.400) (0.358) (0.328) (0.170) (0.181)  (0.199) (0.401) 
   0.128** 0.177 Inverse Mill’s Ratio        
   
   
(0.571) (1.578) 
Period dummies Yes                       Yes 
Session dummies Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 11.128*** 11.099*** -5.918*** -6.066*** -4.062* -5.029** -5.465*** -7.539** -0.440 -0.217 -4.224*** -0.489 -6.095*** 
  (3.687) (3.684) (1.934) (1.929) (2.106) (2.193) (2.345) (2.807) (0.813) (0.854) (1.350) (1.019) (1.945) 
Number of obs.  180 180 378 378 378 378 378 378 400 400 400 378 378 
Left-cens. obs. 99 99 214 214 214 214 214 214 22   214 214 
Right-cens. obs. 1 1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6   6 6 
R2           0.507  0.49  
Log-Likelihood -215.692 -214.151 -427.339 -423.448 -425.264 -422.978 -467.098 -482.757 -689.231  -48.002  -423.442  
Wald χ2 108.31 110.44 226.48 236.08 230.63 236.58    362.66 342.15 14.46 173.71        236.73  
Notes: a RE Tobit=Random Effects Tobit;  b RE GLS=Random Effects Generalized Least Squares; c *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level; 
Table 4.  Effort, rank and comparison income in the experimental data 
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d Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 5.  Effort, rank and comparison income in the survey data: Ordered Probits 
 
 Willingness to work harder for the firm to succeed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Own Income 0.052*** a 0.035*** 0.054*** 0.039*** 
 (0.011) b (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) 
Income Rank  0.109**  0.096* 
  (0.055)  (0.056) 
Comparison    -0.039 -0.020 
Income   (0.034) (0.035) 
Hours per  0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
Week (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male 0.056** 0.070*** 0.080** 0.080** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.032) (0.032) 
Age 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married 0.068** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Years of  0.009** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
Education (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Country dummies Yes 
Number of obs.  9854 9854 9854 9854 
Log-Likelihood -13441.2 -13439.1 -13440.3 -13438.9 
Notes: a *** significant at the .01 level; ** at the .05 level; * at the .1 level; b Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
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Table 6.  Effort, rank and comparison income in subgroups 
 
 
Own Income 0.106*** 0.134*** 0.093*** 0.119***
(0.031) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)
Income Rank 2.726 2.564**
(2.294) (1.215)
Comparison  -0.068*  -0.041* 
Income (0.041) (0.021)
Own Income 0.049** 0.069*** 0.013 0.033**
(0.020) (0.016) (0.018) (0.014)
Income Rank 0.107 0.138
(0.071) (0.088)
Comparison -0.054 -0.046
Income (0.041) (0.048)
Own Income 0.031** 0.041*** 0.036 0.089***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.033) (0.026)
Income Rank 0.052 0.247***
(0.063) (0.092)
Comparison -0.023 -0.020
Income (0.037) (0.054)
Own Income 0.010 0.045* 0.066*** 0.092***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.018)
Income Rank 0.174* 0.124*
(0.094) (0.074)
Comparison -0.022 -0.044
Income (0.055) (0.038)
Own Income 0.029 0.035* 0.027 0.061***
(0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017)
Income Rank -0.003 0.215**
(0.066) (0.094)
Comparison -0.075 -0.031
Income (0.047) (0.041)
Men Women
Not Manager Manager
Public Private
Willingness to work harder for the firm to succeed (ISSP)
Effort in accepted contracts (experimental data)
Men Women
Non-Union Union
 
 
Notes: a *** significant at the .01 level; ** at the .05 level; * at the .1 level; b standard errors in parentheses. 
Other control variables as in Tables 4 and 5 for the experimental and survey results respectively. The 
experimental results come from random effect Tobits, the survey results come from Ordered probits with robust 
standard errors. 
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Table 7.  Effort and past income in the experimental Information Treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable Effort level in accepted contracts 
Models RE Tobit (1) a RE Tobit (2) RE Tobit (3) 
Income       0.106*** b     0.098***    0.107*** 
          (0.013) c (0.012) (0.013) 
Normalized Income Rank       2.368***     3.034***    2.844*** 
          (0.864) (0.868)          (0.896) 
Running Minimum Income        - 0.009 
         (0.015) 
  
Running Maximum Income        - 0.022* 
         (0.013) 
         - 0.038 
(0.024) 
Running Minimum Rank  0.639  
  (0.904)  
Running Maximum Rank   - 4.259*** 
         (1.417) 
       - 3.396** 
        (1.453) 
Demographic variables d Yes Yes Yes 
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Session dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant         - 6.421***  - 5.296***         - 5.144*** 
         (1.171)         (1.307)         (1.308) 
Observations           338 338 338 
Left-Censored obs. 197  197 197 
Right-Censored obs 5 5 5 
Log-Likelihood -351.655 -349.642 -349.446 
Wald χ2 332.93 352.34 349.72 
p > χ2 0.000 0.000 0/000  
Notes: a RE Tobit=Random Error Tobit;  b *** significant at the .01 level; ** at the .05 level; * at the .10 
level; c Standard errors in parentheses; d The demographic and session variables are the same as in Table 
4. 
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